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Abstract
The aim of this research is to investigate the relationship between
obesity and wages, using data for nine countries from the European Com-
munity Household Panel (ECHP) over the period 1998-2001. We improve
upon the existing literature by adopting a Quantile Regression approach
to characterize the heterogenous impact of obesity at different points of
the wage distribution. Our results show that i) the evidence obtained
from mean regression and pooled analysis hides a significant amount of
heterogeneity as the relationship between obesity and wages differs across
countries and wages quantiles and ii) cultural, environmental or insti-
tutional settings do not seem to be able to explain differences among
countries, leaving room for a pure discriminatory effect hypothesis.
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1 Introduction
Although the obesity phenomenon is more recent in Europe compared to the
US, it does create equal concern given that its prevalence has increased by 10-
40% in most European countries over the last decade (WHO, 2003) and obesity
levels based on measured data already range from 13% to 23% (WHO, 2006).
Even more worrisome is the spreading of obesity among teenagers and children
(WHO, 2006). Apart from being a debilitating condition, obesity is also related
to numerous health problems and many chronic diseases. In addition, obesity is
not only a health but also an economic phenomenon (Finkelstein et al. 2005).
The aim of the paper is to focus on the economic side of this phenomenon by
examining the relationship between obesity and wages in a cross-national per-
spective for Europe. So far, the literature on the relationship between weight
and wages has focused on two main research topics: on one side the socioe-
conomic determinants of overweight and obesity, 1 on the other side the costs
associated with obesity. With respect to this last point, economists have iden-
tified two types of costs: direct and indirect costs. Generally speaking, direct
costs include health care costs related to diagnostic and treatment services,
while indirect costs are related to the value of wages lost due to inability to
work because of illness as well as earning lost due to discrimination. This last
aspect is the focus of our paper.
Starting with the pioneering work by Register and Williams (1990) several
researchers have studied the existing relationship between excess weight and
labor market outcomes.2 The vast majority of empirical evidence produced
by those studies agrees with the view that, at individual level, obesity and
labor outcomes (wage, occupation and labor force participation) are negatively
related, although this relationship may vary across population groups. If this is
due to a pure, a priori, discrimination of obese workers or it is, instead, the result
of some economic relationship is still a matter of debate. Fall in productivity
levels (Cawley, 2000, Pagan and Davila, 1997), reduced training opportunities
caused by physical difficulties (Baum and Ford, 2004) and additional costs of the
health insurance covered by the employers and charged on wages (Bhattacharya
and Bundorf, 2005) are among the main reasons used to explain such a negative
correlation.
Although using individual data, all the evidence collected by this literature
is based on a mean regression approach. This represents a major shortcoming as
researchers are not allowed to investigate the role of obesity at different points
1See Philipson and Posner (1999), Lakdawalla and Philipson (2002), Cutler et al. (2003),
Chou et al. (2002) for the US, Loureiro and Nayga (2005) for OECD countries, and Sanz de
Galdeano (2005) for European countries.
2See among others Averett and Korenman (1996), Pagan and Davila (1997), Cawley (2000,
2004), Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2005), Brunello and d’Hombres (2007), Sousa (2005), and
Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2006 and 2007).
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of the wage distribution, and the observed average effect may, indeed, hide more
complex behaviors. In fact, it could be that obesity affects individual wage dif-
ferently at the bottom or at the top of the wage distribution.3 For example,
obesity could represent a serious problem in all those contexts where a high level
of interaction with the public is required or where an intense physical activity
is necessary. On the contrary, it may not represent a serious problem at high
level of wages or, equivalently, in all those cases where intellectual activity is
needed. Alternatively, as suggested by Hamermesh and Biddle (1994), appear-
ance may count more than responsibility and managerial skills (although mainly
for women) at the top of the wage distribution. Therefore, by adopting a mean
regression approach we could miss relevant pieces of information on individual
heterogeneity that may be extremely useful for a correct understanding of the
phenomenon and for tailoring effective anti-discrimination policies.
The aim of this research is to improve upon the existing literature on two
main aspects. First, we adopt a quantile regression approach, to investigate if
and at what level of wages obesity represents a problem. Second, our analy-
sis is based on data from nine countries included in the European Community
Household Panel (ECHP), but differently from most work on this topic we cap-
ture country heterogeneity by modeling the relationship between obesity and
wages country by country. Our results show that the evidence obtained from
mean regression and pooled analysis hides some heterogeneity as the relation-
ship between obesity and wages differs across wage quantiles and countries.
Further, there is no evidence that the results obtained can be related to existing
differences in cultural, environmental or institutional settings across countries.
Finally, it is important to highlight that the majority of evidence collected so
far must be interpreted as statistical association rather than as causal effect.
Nevertheless, in the last part of the paper, we try to assess the causal effect by
adopting an instrumental variable strategy in the context of quantile regression.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical frame-
work and presents an overview of the literature on the relationship between
excess weight and the labor market outcome. Section 3 illustrates the data used
and reports the main descriptive statistics. Section 4 introduces the empirical
strategy adopted and reports the econometric results. In section 5 we deal with
the problem of endogeneity between wages and obesity and present some results
based on Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression (IVQR) technique. Finally,
section 6 draws some conclusions.
3Similar concerns have been raised by Fahr (2006) who finds evidence that the body mass-
wage relation is non-linear.
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2 Empirical Relationship between Obesity and
Wages: Background and Literature Review
Following Register andWilliams (1990), Loh (1993) and Gortmaker et al. (1993)
the relationship between wages and weight has been usually modelled by means
of the traditional human capital wage equation:
Wi,t = β0 + β1BMIi,t +ϕXi,t + εi,t for i = 1, ...N, t = 1, ...T. (1)
where the subscript i refers to individual, t is time, BMI is the body mass in-
dex, defined as individual weight (measured in kilograms) divided by the square
of height (measured in metres squared),4 Xit is a [NT × K] matrix of time-
varying explanatory variables, ε is the vector of residuals.
Based on equation 1 and using different data sets and estimation techniques,
studies on the US data find mixed results on the relationship between wages and
obesity. In particular, Gortmaker et al. (1993) find a negative relationship be-
tween wages and obesity but no evidence to support the hypothesis that obesity
differentials are confounded by health status, since controlling for health status
limitation does not change their results. Moreover, they reject the hypothesis
that socioeconomic origin or ability account for the obesity differential. Averett
and Korenman (1996) find that obese women have lower family income with
respect to non obese women and that differences in economic status by BMI in-
crease when they use a lagged weight value or restrict the sample to women who
were single or childless when the early weight was reported. Pagan and Davila
(1997) find that women pay a penalty for being obese due to labor market
discrimination, while overweight males sort themselves into jobs, via occupa-
tional mobility, to offset this penalty.5 Conley and Glauber (2007) find that
obesity is associated with a reduction in women’s wage and income by 18% and
25% respectively, and a reduction in women’s probability of marriage by 16%.
Moreover, they find that these effects persist across the life course, affecting
older women as well as younger women. Baum and Ford (2004) find that both
men and women experience a persistent wage penalty over the first two decades
of their career. Cawley (2000, 2004) finds that weight lowers wages for white
women and that in absolute value this reduction is equivalent to the wage ef-
fect of one year of education, two years of job tenure and three years of work
4Although the vast majority of researches on obesity are based on BMI measures, the
medical literature agrees that they are seriously flawed because they do not distinguish fat
from fat-free mass such as muscle and bone. For an updated analysis of these issues see
Burkhauser and Cawley (2008).
5In this last case, male overweight workers choose jobs where they find a productivity
advantage over the non-obese or where they have a premium for undertaking more employment
related risks.
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experience. Behrman and Rosenzweig (2001) show that the significant negative
relationship between adult BMI and wages found in cross-sectional estimates re-
flects only a correlation between unmeasured earning endowment and BMI, and
it disappears when controlling for endowments common to monozygotic twins.
Cawley and Danziger (2005) examine the relationship between weight and labor
market outcome in a sample of current and former welfare recipients. They find
that after controlling for individual fixed effects the estimates of the correlation
of obesity and different labor market outcomes is not longer significant.
Similarly, in the European context, there are country specific studies for Eng-
land, Scotland, and Wales (Sargent and Blanchflower, 1994), England (Morris,
2006, 2007), Germany (Cawley et al., 2005) and Denmark (Greve, 2007). Sar-
gent and Blanchflower (1994) find no relationship between earning and obesity
for men and a statistically significant inverse relationship between obesity and
earnings for women. Morris (2006) shows that BMI has a positive and signifi-
cant effect on occupational attainment for males and a negative and significant
effect for females. For Germany, Cawley et al. (2005) find that obesity is
negatively associated with wages, both for men and women, when using OLS
technique. However, once the authors control for the endogeneity using genetic
factors, they conclude that there is no significant relationship between weight
and wages. For Denmark, Greve (2007) finds a negative and significant rela-
tionship between BMI and the probability to be employed for women and an
insignificant relationship for men.
European wide analyses have been conducted using pooled data from the
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) by Sousa (2005), Brunello
and d’Hombres (2007), Lundborg et al. (2007) and Sanz de Galdeano (2007).
Country-by-country European analysis has, instead, been done by Fahr (2006)
and Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2006, 2007). Sousa (2005) focuses on the
impact of the BMI on labor force participation. She finds that being overweight
decreases labor force participation for women, but it increases labor force par-
ticipation for men. However, she is not able to estimate the obesity effect for
each country separately, because using the propensity score matching approach
reduces enormously the sample size. Brunello and d’Hombres (2007) find a neg-
ative and statistically significant impact of obesity on wages independently of
gender for the pooled sample of countries. Furthermore, the negative relation-
ship between obesity and wage is higher in Southern Europe than in Northern
Europe and the size of the effect of the BMI on wage depends on whether an
individual lives in an area with higher or lower than area’s average BMI, sug-
gesting that local economic and social environment does matter. Lundborg et
al. (2007) analyze the effect of obesity on employment, hours worked and hourly
wages in 10 European countries for people aged 50 and above. Pooling all the
countries, they find that obesity is negatively associated with being employed for
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both men and women and with female hourly wages. Moreover, when grouping
the countries in Nordic, Central and Southern, they find that the effects of obe-
sity on labor market outcomes differ across Europe. Sanz de Galdeano (2007)
focuses on the costs of obesity in terms of health, use of health care services and
absenteeism. She finds that obesity is negatively associated with health, espe-
cially for women and in Northern and Central European countries. Moreover,
obesity is shown to be positively associated with the demand for general practi-
tioner and specialist services. Concerning the relationship between obesity and
absenteeism, obese women in some countries are found to be absent from work
more often than healthy-weight women, while no significant effect is found for
men.
A main drawback of all these studies is that they rely on a common effect of
obesity on wages across the whole Europe or country groups. As shown by Fahr
(2006) and Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2006, 2007), allowing for country-
by-country analysis provides more insights into the relationship between wages
and obesity. Fahr (2006) analyzes wage penalties associates with deviation from
a social norm on BMI. He estimates an equation where log of wages is regressed
on two dummies capturing the influence of a deviation from the social norm, and
on two dummies that account for the influence of deviations from an optimal
BMI from a medical point of view. He finds that deviations of more than three
index points in body mass in the upward direction from the norm is sanctioned
with about 7% decrease in hourly wages in Austria, Greece and Spain. Garcia
and Quintana-Domeque (2007) show that there is weak evidence that obese
workers are more likely to be unemployed or tend to be more segregated in self-
employment jobs than their non-obese counterparts. Moreover, they find that
the relationship between labor market outcomes and obesity is heterogeneous
across countries and gender and it can be explained by the role of some labor
market institutions, such as collective bargaining and employer-provided health
insurance.
Overall, two main lessons can be learned from this literature review: i)
the evidence gathered on the relationship between wages and obesity is far
from being conclusive; ii) country heterogeneity plays an important role and
further analysis at country level or even at sub-region level should be undertaken
whenever data are available. At the same time, a major criticism to be raised is
that all these findings are based on “mean” values over the wage distribution.
As also Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2007) have pointed out, average effect
may, indeed, hide more complex behaviors. Therefore, it is crucial to investigate
the role of obesity at different points of the wage distribution, as it could be
that obesity is related to individual wage differently at the bottom or at the
top of the wage distribution. In what follows, we fill this gap by exploring
the relationship between obesity and wages across countries and over the wage
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distribution through quantile regression.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our empirical analysis is based on data from the European Community House-
hold Panel (ECHP), a dataset designed and coordinated by Eurostat, the Eu-
ropean Statistical Office. The ECHP supplies a longitudinal panel of private
households and individuals across countries of the European Union over eight
consecutive years, from 1994 to 2001, with a focus on household income, liv-
ing conditions, individual health, education and employment status. Moreover,
the harmonized design of the ECHP ensures a good level of comparison across
countries and over time.6 We only consider those countries (Denmark, Belgium,
Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria and Finland) and years (1998-
2001) where information on weight and height is available. As done in previous
studies, we drop potential outliers by restricting the sample to include only in-
dividuals with BMI above 15 and below 50. Moreover, we exclude pregnant
women, and we further restrict our analysis to full-time dependent employees
aged between 25 and 64 years.7, 8
The dependent variable in our analysis is the log hourly wage for the respon-
dent’s current job. In order to make data from different countries comparable,
we converted nominal wage into real wage using the time varying purchasing
power parity conversion index provided by the ECHP. Log wage is then re-
gressed on a set of covariates such as a measure of obesity along with a group of
control variables like age, education, training, household compositions, health
status (bad or good health status), number of days absent from work, smoking
habits, private or public sector of activity, occupation and sector of activity, in-
surance paid by the employer, time and country dummies as control variables.
These control covariates are widely used in wage models in order to control for
systematic differences in observed characteristics between individuals, as some
of them may affect simultaneously weight and wages and their effects need to
be netted out.9 Concerning our measure of obesity, it is important to note that
6For further details on the ECHP, see Peracchi (2002).
7As noted by a referee, this age group may appear too broad as some individuals may not
be affected by wage penalties as they get close to the retirement age. Individuals between 25
and 54 years of age should have higher perspectives in terms of career and wage opportunities
(or penalties), and for this reason could represent a more appropriate group for our analysis.
However, empirical results do not change significatively across the two age group selections.
For this reason we’d rather prefer to use the larger age group, given that by reducing the
sample we may incur in sample size problems, even more severe when estimating quantile
models at country level.
8Table A-1 in the Appendix shows the selection procedure with the number of observations
deleted in each step.
9For example, for more educated people (and especially for women) education may have
a negative influence on weight due to higher frequency of weight monitoring (Wardle and
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the standard specification in this literature has been to assume a linear rela-
tionship between the treatment and the outcome (see for example Brunello and
d’Hombres, 2007), and the parameter associated with this variable defines the
effect of interest. However, as noted more recently by some researchers (Kline
and Tobias, 2008, and Shimokawa, 2008) this linearity assumption is not al-
ways credible. In fact, as also Kline and Tobias (2008) states, it may happen
that wages respond less to changes in the BMI for “underweight” or “normal”
compared to “overweight” or “obese” individuals. In alternative, it can happen
that underweight and overweight individuals experience similar wage penalties
generating an inverted U-shaped relationship between BMI and log wages. In
all these situations standard linear treatment-response models are unable to
capture these more complex relationships. There are several ways to account
for non-linearities in the relationship between wages and BMI. Parametrically
this can be done by including high order polinomials of the variable of interest
or by using categories (“obese” vs ”non obese” or finer categories such as “un-
derweight”, “normal”, “overweight” and “obese”). An alternative is to adopt
a non-parametric or semiparametric approach as recently done by Kline and
Tobias (2008) and Shimokawa (2008).
In our specific case the assumption of linearity has been rejected through
a series of formal and informal tests. In particular, i) we run a RESET test
that rejected the hypothesis of linearity of the continuous BMI variable and ii)
produced a graph from an unconditional kernel regression that clearly shows
how health care costs at individual level (proxied by the number of visits to a
GP) exhibit a discontinuity when the BMI is around 30 Kg/m2, for both males
and females.10 Based on this evidence, our strategy is then to use a parametric
approach with the BMI categorized in four dummies (standard clinical classifi-
cations of BMI are underweight (BMI below 18.5), normal (BMI between 18.5
and 25), overweight (BMI between 25 and 30), and obese (BMI above 30)) with
the normal weight as reference category.
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the individual BMI categories, by
country and sex. Men are more likely to be overweight and obese than women:
44.7% and 9.9% are respectively overweight and obese, compared to 22.4% and
7.1% for women. The prevalence of overweight and obesity varies also across
countries. The table also shows that about 10% of women in both Denmark
and Finland are obese, compared to 3.3% in Italy. Similar differences across
countries exist also for men; in Spain the obesity rate is 12.8%, close to that in
Griffith, 2001), different life-styles, lower intertemporal discount rates. Presence of children
may be associated with increase in weight and specific labor market outcomes (Lacobsen et
al. 1999). Health problems are more frequent in obese people and they may also affect labor
market performance (Andreyeva et al. 2005), while smoking is negatively correlated with
labor productivity but also with weight (Molarius et al. 1997, Evans and Montgomery, 1994).
10Graphs are not shown, but are available upon request from the authors.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of BMI, Underweight, Normal Weight, Over-
weight and Obese
Women
BMI Underweight Normal Weight Overweight Obese
Kg/m2 % % % %
Full Sample 23.73 3.71 66.84 22.38 7.06
Austria 23.47 3.95 67.54 22.72 5.80
Belgium 23.09 4.25 74.59 15.03 6.12
Denmark 24.40 1.97 61.68 25.88 10.47
Finland 24.58 1.37 60.97 27.23 10.43
Greece 23.73 2.30 66.90 24.50 5.61
Ireland 23.84 2.91 66.39 23.70 7.00
Italy 22.74 6.52 71.99 18.10 3.34
Portugal 24.42 3.02 62.30 25.57 9.11
Spain 23.06 5.22 72.65 16.95 5.18
Men
BMI Underweight Normal Weight Overweight Obese
Kg/m2 % % % %
Full Sample 25.75 0.39 44.97 44.70 9.94
Austria 25.65 0.04 48.45 41.56 9.94
Belgium 25.48 0.83 48.87 39.37 11.03
Denmark 25.56 0.64 46.95 42.60 9.81
Finland 25.95 0.24 44.04 43.94 11.78
Greece 26.09 0.19 38.45 52.67 8.70
Ireland 25.65 0.92 44.48 45.18 9.41
Italy 25.29 0.31 51.37 41.20 7.12
Portugal 25.85 0.27 43.42 46.61 9.69
Spain 26.20 0.46 38.87 47.84 12.83
Notes: Underweight, normal weight, overweight and obese workers are individuals with BMI lower than
18.5, between 18.5 and 25, between 25 and 30 and over 30, respectively as indicated by WHO.
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Belgium and Finland (11% and 11.8% respectively), and far from Italy’s rate
(7.1%). Tables A-2 and A-3 in the Appendix report the full set of summary
statistics for the pooled sample and by country.
4 Ordinary Least Squares vs Quantile regres-
sion results
In this section we report the results of the empirical analysis carried out. As first
step, we report the coefficients of the BMI classes obtained from OLS regressions
for the pooled sample and for each country, by gender. The results are based
on a sample population aged between 25 and 64 years.
According to Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2006) restricting our attention
to this age group should help to reduce the problem of measurement errors in
BMI (difference between self-reported and objectively measured anthropomet-
ric indicators). In fact, as also proved by Thomas and Frankenberg (2002), the
difference between self reported and objectively measured BMI remains almost
constant across individuals for people between 20 and 60, at least taking into
account the available evidence for the US. Although our age group is slightly dif-
ferent from the one considered by Thomas and Frankenberg (2002), this should
not represent a problem as we have tested that our results remain unchanged
once the more restrictive sample based on individuals aged between 25 and 54
is used. 11 Moreover, as measurement error does not need to be the same across
countries, country fixed effects are included in the pooled estimate to capture
such heterogeneity.
In Tables 2 and 3 coefficients are reported under different model specifica-
tions for women and men, respectively. We start by estimating a parsimonious
model in column 1 where we do not control for health status and occupational
dummies (but we control for all the covariates presented in section 3), we then
include only the health status indicator in column 2, only the occupational
dummies in column 3 and finally both set of variables in column 4 to assess
11Using the Third National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES III), which
contains measures of true and self-reported weight and height (and therefore, BMI), to correct
the self-reports of weight and height in the NLSY, Cawley (2004) shows that this does not
seem to be a major problem. He finds that even if women tend to underreport their weights
but not their heights, using reported BMI instead of corrected BMI does not alter significantly
the estimates. Unfortunately, we do not have the possibility to apply a similar correction due
to the lack of data on true measures of weight and height in Europe. Moreover, Sanz de
Galdeano (2007) has compared aggregate obesity rates based on objective measures obtained
by the WHO Global Database on Body Mass Index with the corresponding figures derived
from the ECHP self-reported information on height and weight. She finds that the correlation
coefficient between the ECHP and the WHO Global Database measures of obesity prevalence
is reasonably high: 0.76 (p < 0.05) for men and 0.96 (p < 0.01) for women. Similar results
are obtained when computing the Spearman rank correlation coefficients.
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the robustness of the result to the inclusion of these potential endogenous vari-
ables. We propose this augmented specification procedure because as noticed
by Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2007), non-random sorting of individuals
into different occupations might lead to sample selection bias if obese workers
are more likely to work in specific occupations. Similar problems might arise
when controlling for health status. For example, if obese individuals are more
likely to be hired to work in occupations with lower wages, we might under-
estimate the effect of weight on wages after controlling for the occupational
variables.12 Looking at the results reported in Table 3, we can see that for men
the coefficients barely changes across the different specifications, showing that
the potential endogeneity problem associated with the health and occupational
variables does not affect the estimates. The results for women are slightly dif-
ferent (see Table 2). While the inclusion of the health variable does not affect
the weight coefficients (column 2), controlling for the occupational categories
reduces the magnitude of the obesity coefficient but only for the pooled sample
and for Finland and Denmark. The coefficients for the other two categories of
weight are almost constant. The result found for the group of women is compat-
ible with the “selection effect” found by Lakdawalla and Philipson (2007), for
which heavier women are selected into jobs requiring strength that are usually
also less paid. 13 However, it is important to note that the wage penalties do
not seem to be entirely explained by sorting of obese individuals into specific
occupations and for many countries it does not affect the estimated at all.
Based on the above evidence, we adopt the specification in column four
as our reference model. Furthermore, as we are particularly interested in the
relationship between obesity and wages, in what follow we will discuss only the
results associated with the obesity coefficient, having in mind that the other
weight categories are included as control in the regression model. In order to
allow for flexibility, we have estimated the model separately for men and women
and by country. Furthermore, reported coefficients are robust to adjustments for
heteroskedasticity. For the pooled sample the obesity coefficient is negative for
12We thank an anonimous referee for pointing this out.
13In their work Lakdawalla and Philipson (2007) use a dataset containing detailed informa-
tion at job level within occupational categories based on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles
(DOT). Each occupational definition lists a title for the occupation, as well as a description
of the occupation’s skill requirements and demands. Unfortunately, if the “selection” inter-
pretation is the correct one, we are convinced that the occupational variables, as available
in the ECHP dataset, do not allow to properly account for the heterogeneous impact of the
BMI status on wages, given that this selection occurs differently across job positions within
the same occupation category. In turn, this leads to a major problem in which controlling
for occupational dummies the (true) effect of obesity on wages can be underestimated, while
not controlling for occupational variables may cause an even more serious problem with the
overestimation of the same effect. In this specific case, we decided to include occupational
variables as this could at most provide an underestimation of our coefficients, thus providing
prudential estimates of the effect of BMI on wages.
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women (see Table 2) and positive for men (see Table 3), although statistically
significant (at 1%) only for women. This suggests the existence of a wage penalty
only for women at European level.
Country by country estimates provide a slightly different picture, showing
the existence of some heterogeneity in the relationship between wages and weight
across European countries especially for men.14 Not for all countries in our
dataset women seem to suffer from a wage penalty, given that in Austria and
Belgium there is no evidence of an association between wage and obesity. Fur-
thermore, whenever this association is statistically significant, the impact of the
wage penalty is rather heterogeneous across countries, ranging from -5% in Den-
mark to -11% in Spain. As far as men are concerned, differences among countries
are even more striking. In fact, we observe three different clusters: Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Portugal and Spain which confirm the result of no
statistical association from the pooled sample, Greece and Italy which show a
wage penalty (-4% and -5% respectively) and, finally, Austria which record a
wage premium (4%).15
As discussed in section 2, the whole literature on the relationship between
wage and obesity has been based on a mean regression approach, which looks
only at the role of obesity at the mean level of the wage, ignoring individual
wage heterogeneity. However, it could be that obesity affects individual wages
differently across the wage distribution. A way to overcome such limitation
is to adopt a quantile regression approach that allows us to characterize the
whole conditional distribution of wage. Indeed, we may expect that in the
lowest points of the wage distribution workers perform manual activities that
require effort and greater muscle mass. Similarly, in the highest points of the
wage distribution intellectual activity is needed and obesity may not represent
an issue. In the first case we should expect a positive effect of the obesity
coefficient in the left tail of the wage distribution, while in the second case a not
significant effect in the right tail. Alternatively, as suggested by Hamermesh and
Biddle (1994), appearance may count more than responsibility and managerial
skills at the top of the wage distribution (although mainly for women), and for
this reason we might expect a negative obesity coefficient at least in the right
tail of the wage distribution.
14Our results are slightly different from those reported in Garcia and Quintana-Domeque
(2007). This may depend from the different model specification adopted and from the sample
selection procedure. Indeed, the conclusions remain very similar. We have not been able to
compare our results with those of Brunello and d’Hombres (2007) as these authors do not
present OLS estimates.
15In absolute values these percentages are not negligible. For example, given a coefficient
of 0.05 (as for women in the pooled sample), and assuming an annual salary of 30,000 euros,
the penalty effect amounts to about 125 euros per month. Slightly higher values are obtained
at country level for some countries (for example in Spain it reaches the highest value of 225
euros per month).
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Table 2: OLS Regression Estimates, Underweight, Overweight and Obesity Co-
efficients, Pooled Sample Women
Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Obese -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.05***
Overweight -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***
Underweight 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Austria Obese 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Overweight 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Underweight 0.06 0.06 0.06** 0.06**
Belgium Obese -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
Overweight -0.03** -0.03** -0.03* -0.03*
Underweight -0.04 -0.03 -0.04* -0.04
Denmark Obese -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.05***
Overweight -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Underweight 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.03
Finland Obese -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.07***
Overweight -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04***
Underweight 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Greece Obese -0.05* -0.05 -0.06** -0.05*
Overweight -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Underweight -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
Ireland Obese -0.06* -0.06* -0.04 -0.04
Overweight 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Underweight 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.05
Italy Obese -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07***
Overweight -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.04***
Underweight -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04
Portugal Obese -0.06* -0.05 -0.04 -0.04
Overweight -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.03* -0.03*
Underweight -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Spain Obese -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.11***
Overweight -0.04** -0.04** -0.02 -0.02
Underweight 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Notes: Model specification in column (1) is the reference model as it does not include
health status (bad or good health status) and occupational dummies (Professionals, Clerks,
Agriculture and Fishery occupations, Elementary occupations); in column (2) it includes
only health status; in column (3) it includes only occupational dummies; finally, model in
column (4) includes both health status and occupational dummies.
Control variables include: country and time dummies, individual age, cohabitation status
(living in couple or not), presence of children under twelve in the household, number of days
absent from work, highest level of education completed (primary, secondary and tertiary),
sector of activity (public or private), health insurance status (whether the health insurance
is provided by the employer), and sector (agriculture, industry and services). Estimates
are obtained using sample weights. Huber-White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
are adjusted in order to take into account the presence of multiple observations for each
individual.
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Table 3: OLS Regression Estimates, Underweight, Overweight and Obesity Co-
efficients, Pooled Sample Men
Men
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Obese -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
Overweight 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02***
Underweight -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.11***
Austria Obese 0.02 0.03 0.04*** 0.04***
Overweight 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02**
Underweight 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.37*** 0.37***
Belgium Obese 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Overweight 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02**
Underweight -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
Denmark Obese 0.02 0.01 0.03* 0.02
Overweight 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.02*
Underweight 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04
Finland Obese -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Overweight -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Underweight -0.28** -0.27** -0.30** -0.30**
Greece Obese -0.04* -0.04 -0.04** -0.04**
Overweight 0.02 0.02 0.03** 0.03**
Underweight -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08
Ireland Obese 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Overweight 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Underweight -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.18***
Italy Obese -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05***
Overweight 0.01 0.01 0.01* 0.01*
Underweight -0.22*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.21***
Portugal Obese -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
Overweight 0.02 0.02 0.03* 0.02*
Underweight -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01
Spain Obese -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
Overweight 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00
Underweight -0.19 -0.19 -0.11 -0.11
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Notes: Model specification in column (1) is the reference model as it does not include
health status (bad or good health status) and occupational dummies (Professionals, Clerks,
Agriculture and Fishery occupations, Elementary occupations); in column (2) it includes
only health status; in column (3) it includes only occupational dummies; finally, model in
column (4) includes both health status and occupational dummies.
Control variables include: country and time dummies, individual age, cohabitation status
(living in couple or not), presence of children under twelve in the household, number of days
absent from work, highest level of education completed (primary, secondary and tertiary),
sector of activity (public or private), health insurance status (whether the health insurance
is provided by the employer), and sector (agriculture, industry and services). Estimates
are obtained using sample weights. Huber-White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
are adjusted in order to take into account the presence of multiple observations for each
individual.
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Tables 4 and 5 report the quantile regression estimates for the pooled sample,
respectively for women and men with both health and occupational variables
included. What emerges from these results is that while for women in Table 4 the
QR estimates turn out to be not very different from the estimates computed
at the mean, for men in Table 5 the opposite holds. Moreover, the effect of
obesity for women is negative and statistically significant at 1% along the wage
distribution, and in absolute terms slightly lower on the tails of the distribution
(-4% at 15th, 25th and 85th percentile, respectively) compared to the central
part (5%).
Table 4: Quantile Regressions Estimates: Pooled Sample, Women - (n. obs
30,313)
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Obese -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.04***
Overweight -0.01** -0.01** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03***
Underweight -0.03** -0.03** -0.01 0.02 0.02
Union 3.99*** 3.99*** 3.69*** 3.68*** 3.52***
Insurance 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06***
Training 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.08***
Sickness Days -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00
Bad Health Status 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.04** 0.00
Age 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
Age Squared 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Private -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.06***
Couple 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.01** 0.00 0.01
Children 0.01 0.00 0.01** 0.03*** 0.03***
Secondary 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16***
Tertiary 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.33*** 0.38*** 0.41***
Smoker 0.01** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
Clerks -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.19*** -0.20***
AgrFishery -0.20*** -0.23*** -0.30*** -0.38*** -0.39***
Elementary -0.21*** -0.23*** -0.27*** -0.33*** -0.35***
Agriculture -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.09*** -0.07**
Industry 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03***
Constant -0.58*** -0.38*** -0.20*** 0.00 0.09
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Note: Control variables include also country and time dummies.
Differently from women, the effect of obesity for men is more heterogeneous
across quantiles. In particular, men seem to suffer from wage penalty due to
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Table 5: Quantile Regression Estimates: Pooled Sample, Men - (n. obs 47,374)
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Obese -0.02*** 0.00 0.02** 0.02*** 0.01
Overweight 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03***
Underweight -0.12*** -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.03
Union 3.86*** 3.63*** 3.05*** 2.67*** 2.48***
Insurance 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06***
Training 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.09***
Sickness Days -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.03* -0.02 0.00
Bad Health Status -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.05*** -0.05***
Age 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04***
Age Squared 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Private -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.03*** 0.00 0.01
Couple 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
Children 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02***
Secondary 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.15***
Tertiary 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.28*** 0.34*** 0.36***
Smoker -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.01** -0.01*
Clerks -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.16***
AgrFishery -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.18*** -0.21*** -0.22***
Elementary -0.16*** -0.18*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.24***
Agriculture -0.28*** -0.22*** -0.17*** -0.12*** -0.14***
Industry 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02***
Constant -0.54*** -0.30*** 0.16*** 0.32*** 0.39***
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Note: Control variables include also country and time dummies.
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obesity (-2%) at 15th percentile, and enjoy a wage premium at (2%) at 50th and
75th percentiles, while the effect is not statistically significant in the remaining
quantiles (see Table 5). These last results seem to contradict both the ”obe-
sity as an asset” and the Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) “appearance theory”
hypotheses.
Looking at country specific estimates in Table 6, the heterogeneity in the
statistical association between wages and obesity is even more pronounced. For
women, in Ireland the wage penalty is found only in the left part of the wage
distribution, in Greece only at the median of the wage distribution, in Italy the
relationship is characterized by a reversed U-shaped curve with larger penalties
on both tails. No regular patterns can be found in countries like Denmark,
Finland and Spain, although coefficients vary quite a lot across quantiles (for
example, in Finland, while the mean effect for women is equal to -7.0%, using
quantile regression the effect ranges from -10.0% at 15th percentile to -4.0% at
85th percentile. For men the OLS results are not significant, while the quantile
estimates show a penalty of 5% at 15th percentile). From a statistical point
of view, we tested the difference of the coefficients across quantiles. Accord-
ing to these tests we rejects the equality of most pair-wise comparisons of the
βs in some countries (exceptions are Denmark, Ireland, Italy and Spain), and
in case of the pooled model for almost all male coefficients. This proves two
things: 1) countries are different in terms of wage-obesity relationship, and 2)
within some countries the relationship between obesity and wage is different
across quantiles.16 In summary, these findings seem to suggest that it would be
misleading to ignore the heterogeneity of the obesity effect across countries and
along the wage distribution.
4.1 Are there alternative explanations to the statistical
association between wage and obesity?
In the previous section we have found evidence of an important statistical asso-
ciation between wages and obesity. However, it is important to understand to
what extent this association could be explained, as suggested by Baum and Ford
(2004), by one of the following three possible sources: i) losses in productivity
due to health problems; ii) agents’ myopic behavior; iii) provision of health
insurance by employers who discount higher health care costs for obese workers
in the form of lower wages. We expect that if differences in wages between obese
and non obese workers are due to one of the above mentioned reasons, once con-
trolled for them, the obesity coefficient should become statistically insignificant.
Formally, to take into account the above mentioned hypotheses, we specify the
model in the following way:
16A table with the full list of pair-wise comparison tests is available upon request.
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Table 6: Quantile Regression Estimates: Obesity Coefficients by country
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Women
Austria 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.07** 0.05*
Belgium -0.01 -0.03 -0.07** -0.01 0.00
Denmark -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06***
Finland -0.1*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.04**
Greece -0.03 -0.04 -0.06** 0.00 -0.01
Ireland -0.06** -0.05* -0.03** 0.00 -0.01
Italy -0.06** -0.06** -0.03 -0.05** -0.08***
Portugal 0.01 0.00 -0.04* -0.03 -0.03
Spain -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.1*** -0.11*** -0.11***
Men
Austria 0.02 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07***
Belgium 0.05** 0.04** 0.02 -0.02 -0.02
Denmark 0.04** 0.03 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02
Finland -0.05*** -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03
Greece -0.04* -0.06*** -0.02 0.00 0.00
Ireland 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06***
Italy -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.03** -0.02
Portugal -0.06*** 0.02 0.03* 0.04 0.04
Spain -0.01 -0.04** -0.02 -0.02 0.00
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Note: Coefficients for underweight and overweight dummies are not shown. Control variables
are as in table 2.
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Wi,t = β0+Σ
4
j=1βjBMIj,i,t+γDi,t+δDi,tBMI4,i,t+ϕXi,t+εi,t (2)
for i = 1, .....N, t = 1, .....T
where Di,t represents the variable of interest (productivity proxy, partic-
ipation to training programs, and health insurance), BMI4,i,t is the obesity
category and BMI1,i,t, BMI2,i,t, and BMI3,i,t are underweight, normo-weight,
and overweight categories, respectively. Therefore, δ is our parameter of inter-
est. In this section we test the significance of these hypotheses. Results are
reported in Table 7.
Productivity hypothesis. In order to test whether obese workers earn
less than non obese workers because they are less productive, we interact the
obesity dummy with a productivity proxy, namely the number of days of absence
from work due to sickness. The ECHP asks respondents to report the number
of days they were absent from work during the last four working weeks because
of illness or other reasons. It should be noted that this measure includes absent
episodes due to illness and any other reason so it is not possible to isolate the
impact of obesity-related illness episodes. Looking at Table 7, for the pooled
sample we find that health limitations do not affect obese workers’ wages differ-
ently from non obese workers’ and the obesity wage penalties remain unchanged
for both men and women (panel A). This suggests that obesity influences wages
through a channel different from productivity losses due to health limitations.17
Myopic behavior hypothesis. According to the agents’ myopic behav-
ior hypothesis, obese workers heavily discount the future by caring less about
obesity-related health problems and invest less in human capital accumulation
(less training), thus generating a flatter wage profile.18 We test this hypothesis
by interacting the obese dummy with the training dummy.19 The results (Panel
17We should keep in mind that obesity might affect productivity in ways that are not as
easily measured. The negative effect of obesity on appearance, for example, can affect con-
fidence and communication, thereby influencing productivity. Mobius and Rosenblat (2004)
estimate that confidence accounts for approximately 20% of the beauty premium. Persico et
al. (2004) hypothesize that height increases the chances that teenagers participate in social
activities, such as nonacademic clubs and sports. This participation, in turn, helps them to
learn skills that are rewarded by employers and might enhance productivity.
18Komlos et al. (2004) discuss the role of time-preference as determinant of obesity epidemic.
Using the savings rate and consumer debt as indicators of the rate of time preference, they
find some empirical evidence for the US and OECD countries confirming the link between
obesity and time preference.
19It must be noted that, unfortunately, this variable does not allow to disentangle decisions
to invest in training taken by employers and those taken by employees, thus potentially weak-
ening the possibility to discriminate between the myopic behavior hypothesis and the pure
discrimination hypothesis. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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B) show that while investment in training significantly increases wages for men
and women, the interaction obesity-training is not significant for both women
and men, while the obesity coefficients are slightly lower at the tail of the distri-
bution for women and not anymore significant in the center of the distribution
(50th and 75th percentiles) for men with respect to our reference model. This
indicates that, at least for women, agents’ myopic behavior is not what drives
the negative relationship between weight and wages. On the contrary, for men
by netting out the myopic behavior effect, the wage penalty due to obesity in
the center of the distribution disappears. 20
Health care insurance costs hypothesis. We investigate whether the
observed wage differential between obese and non obese in European countries
can be explained by the costs of health care insurance covered by the employer
and charged on employees’ wage. We test this hypothesis by interacting the
obesity dummy with the health insurance dummy and we find that the interac-
tion coefficient is positive but not significant both for men and women (Panel
C). As found for men in the myopic behavior hypothesis, controlling for health
care insurance costs the negative association between wage and obesity disap-
pears in the center of the distribution, while for the female group we can note
a small increase in the wage penalty in the lower part of the distribution and a
small reduction in higher part. Overall, this result should not come as a surprise
given that the countries in our sample are characterized by universal coverage of
health care services and that health insurance provided by the employer covers
additional services not included in the public insurance. As for the previous
hypotheses, this finding seems to indicates that health care insurance costs are
not able to explain the negative relationship between weight and wages.
To complete this analysis, we have run a new model in which all these
hypotheses have been considered jointly. Results are reported in Panel D in
Table 7.21 Concerning men, we observe an increase in the wage penalty in the
first percentile, while the coefficients at the 50th and 75th percentiles loose their
significance. For women, we observe a small increase in the wage penalty in the
first and third quantiles.
After testing for the significance of the differences of obesity coefficients in
models with (Panel D) and without interactions, we find that none of these dif-
ferences are statistically significat at 5% level in the pooled sample. At country
20Baum and Ford (2004) use the experience variable as a proxy for engagement in training
activities. Our data allow to use directly the variable training. The ECHP does not provide
a specific variable “years of experience on the labor market”. It provides only the variable
tenure (“years of experience in the current job”), but this variable has a large number of
missing data (about 9,000 observations in the pooled sample). Therefore, we prefer not to use
this variable.
21The full set of results with all other covariates and results country by country are available
upon request.
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level, there are very few cases in which the interaction terms change significa-
tively the obesity coefficients in some quintiles. 22 Given that none of these
hypotheses seem to be able to change substantially the significance of the obe-
sity coefficients, our findings could suggest the existence of a pure discriminatory
effect, although not conclusive in the sense we are not estimating a causal effect.
4.2 The role of labor market institutions
As recently outlined by Freeman (2008), there is a widespread consensus on the
fact that institutions have a major impact on the distribution of income. Among
them, the presence of labor market institutions plays a major role in shaping it.
Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2007) have studied this issue looking at how the
presence of unions, their membership diffusion, the level of bargaining coverage
and at what level (centralized and/or coordinated) can affect the relationship
between obesity and wages. In this section we try to assess whether labor mar-
ket institutions may help to understand the different results obtained in terms
of the relationship between obesity and wages across countries by means of three
indicators of labor market regulations: trade union density, bargaining govern-
ability, and degree of employment protection legislation (EPL) as reported in
table A-5 in the appendix. In particular, we expect that in countries with the
highest levels of union density, bargaining governability and EPL, where the
wage setting is more controlled and employers and firms play a minor role in
the wage setting, the relationship between obesity and wages is not significant
or small in size. Unfortunately, we cannot empirically test these hypotheses in
a regression framework for two main reasons: i) the ECHP data set does not
provide union participation at individual level; ii) data on level of union density,
bargaining governability, and EPL are obviously collected at country level and
time invariant. However, we can provide an indirect evidence of the relationship
between labor market institutions and wage penalty differences across countries
by means of Spearman correlation coefficients.23
Table 8 shows the ranking of countries according to the size of the obesity
effect as obtained in Table 6. Two main results emerge from this table: 1)
with few exceptions the signs of the correlation coefficients are all negative, 2)
22The full set of results is available upon request
23Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2007) analyze the relationship between labor outcomes
(employment and wage) and collective bargaining coverage (the number of employees covered
by a collective agreement over the total number of employees) through a simple graphical
analysis, where they plot labor market institutions indicators on the X-axis and obesity labor
market outcomes on the Y-axis. They find a positive association between collective bargaining
coverage and the probability of being unemployed with respect to being employed for women,
but no clear relationship for men. Moreover they find a strong positive association between
collective bargaining coverage and wage gaps for women but no clear relationship for men.
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Table 7: Quantile Regression Estimates with Interactions, Pooled Sample
Women
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Base Model
Obesity -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.04***
(Panel A) Base + Sickness Interaction
Obesity -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.04**
Sickness Days -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00
Obesity*Sickness 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.07
(Panel B) Base + Training Interaction
Obesity -0.03* -0.04** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.03*
Training 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.08***
Obesity*Training -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02
(Panel C) Base + Insurance Interaction
Obesity -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.04** -0.03*
Insurance 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06***
Obesity*Insurance 0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.02
(Panel D) Base+ All Interactions
Obesity -0.05** -0.04** -0.06*** -0.05** -0.03
Sickness Days -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00
Training 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.08***
Insurance 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06***
Obesity*Sickness 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.05
Obesity*Training -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00
Obesity*Insurance 0.04* 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.02
Men
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Base Model
Obesity -0.02*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01
(Panel A) Base + Sickness Interaction
Obesity -0.02*** 0.00 0.02** 0.02** 0.01
Sickness Days -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.03* -0.02 0.00
Obesity*Sickness 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 -0.03
(Panel B) Base + Training Interaction
Obesity -0.03*** -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Training 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08***
Obesity*Training 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03* 0.02
(Panel C) Base + Insurance Interaction
Obesity -0.02*** 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
Insurance 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06***
Obesity*Insurance 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03* 0.02
(Panel D) Base+ All Interactions
Obesity -0.03*** -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01
Sickness Days -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.03* -0.02 0.00
Training 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08***
Insurance 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.06***
Obesity*Sickness 0.00 -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
Obesity*Training 0.02 0.03* 0.01 0.02 0.02
Obesity*Insurance 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Note: The control variables are as in table 2 plus underweight and overweight dummies.
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correlations are different across quantiles and across labor market institution
indicators. A negative sign is a symptom that labor market institutions foster
the use of the obesity factor as a wage penalty, thus contrary to theoretical
predictions. Negative signs are recorded for women at almost all quantiles of
the wage distribution and for all indicators. For men a positive sign is found
only for EPL at all points in the wage distribution. This last case seems to
be the only one in our analysis where the empirical analysis is in accordance
with the theoretical prediction. The highest value of the correlation is found
for the lowest quintile. Although obtained through a different methodology and
adopting slightly different labor market indicator, these results match, at least
for women, those obtained by Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2007) on the
same data.
Table 8: Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients by Quantiles
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Women
Union Density -0.092 -0.125 -0.217 -0.125 -0.358
Bargaining Governability -0.476 -0.131 0.036 -0.452 0.298
EPL -0.325 -0.35 -0.05 -0.025 -0.025
Men
Union Density -0.400 -0.408 -0.342 -0.333 -0.083
Bargaining Governability -0.214 0.048 -0.440 -0.714 -0.286
EPL 0.533 0.292 0.058 0.100 0.300
Note: Each cell in the table reports the Spearman correlation coefficient between the obesity
coefficient for each quantile at country level and the corresponding ranking for each labor
market indicator. For example, the value reported at the cross between the 15th quantile
and the row with union density represents the Spearman correlation coefficient between the
obesity coefficients recorded for each country in that quantile and the ranking of the union
density variable.
5 Dealing with the endogeneity problem
As already discussed in previous sections, the results produced so far cannot
be interpreted as causal relationship from obesity to wages. In an effort to add
robustness to our previous results and to compare them with what has been pre-
sented in the literature so far, here below we replicate our analysis by employing
an IV approach. In what follows we first review some of the main contributions
in this field and then present our estimation strategy based on Instrumental
Variable Quantile Regression (IVQR) and then the results obtained.
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5.1 The obesity endogeneity problem in the empirical lit-
erature
Standard OLS techniques may yield biased estimates of the relationship between
wage and obesity for at least three reasons. First, unobservable individual ef-
fects associated to genetic and non-genetic factors, such as ability and parental
background, might be correlated both with earning and the respondent’s body
mass index. Second, a problem of reverse causality might exist. For instance, the
quality and the quantity of food might determine how an individual behaves, her
level of productivity and inventiveness at work, and her earning potentialities,
but, at the same time, individual working position and wages might influence
her quality and quantity of food. Finally, the BMI can be measured with errors,
as researchers rely on self reported measures of weight and height.24 In this
case, the error term is correlated with the variable of interest by construction,
generating inconsistent estimates.
Several studies have dealt with the endogeneity problem using alternative
identification strategies. Sargent and Blanchflower (1994), Gortmaker et al.
(1993), and Averett and Korenman (1996) address reverse causality by replac-
ing the contemporaneous BMI with its lagged value. However, the validity of
this strategy relies on the hypothesis of independence between the lagged BMI
and the residual, which is unlikely to be true especially in presence of unob-
served individual effects. Baum and Ford (2004), Cawley (2004), Cawley and
Danziger (2005) and Sanz de Galdeano (2007) use the fixed effect estimators
to control for unobservable individual effects. This identification strategy does
show some drawbacks. In particular, as also noted by Garcia and Quintana-
Domeque (2007), a fixed effect strategy does not solve the reverse causality
problem. In addition, there is a clear trade-off between consistency of the es-
timates obtained with longer panel and plausibility of the unobservables’ time
invariance.
Many researchers have instead adopted an instrumental variable approach
to deal with the problem of endogeneity, using different instruments. Pagan
and Davila (1997) choose as instrument indicators of health problems, such as
self-esteem and family poverty. Cawley (2000 and 2004) adopts the BMI of
“biological” family members (including parents’, siblings’ and children’ body
mass index) and Cawley et al. (2005) use the weight of a child or of a parent,
under the assumption that the BMI of a biological family member does not
affect the respondent’s wage directly. Morris (2006) adopts the average BMI
and prevalence of obesity across individuals living in the same health authority
area as instruments. Greve (2007) uses information on whether the individ-
uals’ parents have ever taken medication related to obesity or obesity related
diseases (namely hypertension and Type 2 diabetes) and their mortality cause.
24See also footnote 10 for a discussion about this issue.
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Lundborg et al. (2007) choose as instruments the presence of other obese per-
sons in the household, being an oldest child, and having sisters only. Finally,
Brunello and d’Hombres (2007) solve the endogeneity problem by considering
the “biological” BMI (computed as average of all household members’ BMI)
as instrument. The main drawback with the IV approach is that two condi-
tions have to be satisfied to ensure the validity of an instrument. It must be
correlated with the endogenous variable and uncorrelated with the outcome’s
residuals. While the first condition can be easily tested, with respect to the
second condition only indirect evidence can be provided given that no formal
procedure exists to test for absence of correlation between the instrument and
wage residuals.
Finally, in order to overcome the difficulty of finding suitable instruments,
Sousa (2005) uses a propensity score matching approach. However, since this
procedure implies to find comparable individuals within the same dataset it
might lead to reduce enormously the sample size. A similar problem is found by
Behrman and Rosenzweig (2001) and Conley and Glauber (2007) when using
information on siblings and twins to remove the common household effect due to
both genetic and non-genetic factors, given that the number of households with
at least two children living in is limited and, therefore, it may create problems
of representativeness.
With the data in our hands, we believe that the IV approach is the most con-
vincing (among those mentioned above) to deal with the endogeneity problem,
despite its drawback concerning the choice of the instrument. In order to better
understand the limit of “biological” BMI we should notice that the residual of
the wage equation (1) can be decomposed as:
εi,t = Gi,t +NGi,t + νi,t (3)
where Gi,t is the genetic component, NGi,t is the non genetic component and
νi,t is a residual, i.i.d. over individuals and time.
Several studies reviewed in Cawley (2004) have shown that the correlation
of weight within household members is due to genetic factors rather than to
environmental influences. More specifically, according to Grilo and Pogue-Geile
(1991), environmental experiences shared among family members are not im-
portant in determining individual differences in weight. Therefore it is unlikely
that biological BMI is correlated with the unobserved non genetic errors and it
can be safely assumed that Corr(bBMIi,t , NGi,t) = 0. Unfortunately, the error
terms of the wage and obesity equations could be still correlated if unobserv-
able genetic factors affecting individual earnings are correlated to transmitted
genetic variation in weight (Corr(bBMIi,t , Gi,t) 6= 0), although this event may
not be very likely when analyzing labor market outcomes (Cawley, 2004).
Ideally, the best strategy to control for unobserved genetic factors is to use
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same-sex siblings or twins’ weight as an instrument. In practice, apart from the
reduction in sample size mentioned above, it has some additional drawbacks: i)
it is not possible, in all surveys, to identify siblings because they may have left
the original households; ii) in our specific case, it is likely that if they live in the
same household it is because they are still at school and/or not working, thus
not useful for identifying the relationship of interest.
Given the alternatives provided in the literature and the availability of the in-
formation included in the ECHP dataset, we decide to use the “biological” BMI
as instrument, as Brunello and d’Hombres (2007) proved to be reliable on the
same dataset. The “biological” BMI (from which we have derived the four cate-
gories - biological underweight, biological normo-weight, biological over-weight,
and biological obese) averages out all the available individual body mass index
of the family members biologically related who completed the questionnaire.25
However, compared to previous studies we innovate by adopting an Instrumental
Variable Quantile Regression (IVQR) approach.
5.2 The Instrumental Variable Quantile Approach
As discussed by Blundell and Powell (2003) and Lee (2007), there are three
major alternative approaches to endogenous quantile regression models, namely
the instrumental variable (IV) approach (Hong and Tamer, 2003, Chen et al.
2003, Honore’ and Hu, 2004, Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2005, 2006), the fit-
ted value approach (Amemiya, 1982; Powell, 1983), and the control function
approach (Chesher, 2003, Ma and Koenker, 2006, Blundell and Powell, 2005,
Lee, 2007).26 In this paper, we adopt an IV approach, following Chernozhukov
and Hansen (2005, 2006), because their estimation approach is computationally
convenient to our specific purpose and simple to implement. In addition, their
estimation procedure leads to an inference procedure that is valid even when
one of the key conditions for identification of the model, that the endogenous
variable is statistically dependent on the instrument, fails. Since we are aware
of the critics associated with the biological BMI as instrument, we opted for
Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005, 2006) approach because it leads to a testing
procedure which is robust to the presence of week instruments.27 According
to them, an Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression (IVQR) model can be
25The choice of an instrument is often a matter of debate in the empirical literature especially
for the impossibility of testing the validity of the exclusion restrictions and we are aware that
our instrument is far from perfect. In order to make our instrument more convincing and given
the validity of the concern raised by one of the referee, we have also run the IVQR analysis
controlling for average educational level for family members. Despite this further control in
our model, the obesity coefficients results do not change.
26For an exhaustive review of endogenous quantile regression models and their differences
see Lee (2007).
27For more details see Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005, 2006), from which this section
heavily draws.
26
described in formal terms as:
Y = D′α(U) +X ′β(U) (4)
U |X,Z ∼ Uniform(0, 1)
D = δ(Z,X, V ) (5)
where V is statistically dependent on U
τ 7→ D′α(τ) +X ′β(τ) (6)
strictly increasing in τ .
In these equations, Y is the scalar outcome variable of interest (the log of the
hourly wage), U is a scalar random variable that aggregates all of the unobserved
factors affecting the structural outcome equation, D is a vector of endogenous
variables, where V is a vector of unobserved disturbances determining D and
correlated with U , Z is a vector of instrumental variables independent from the
disturbance U and correlated with D, X is a vector of included control vari-
ables. We refer to Y ≤ SY (τ | D,X) as the structural quantile equation. At the
heart of the model is similarity, a generalization of rank invariance assumption.
The assumption of similarity states that given the information (Z,X ,V ) the
expectation of U does not vary across the endogenous state D. It is a key iden-
tification device. From eq.4 to eq.6, the event Y ≤ SY (τ | D,X) is equivalent
to the event {U < τ}. It follows from eq.4 that
P [Y ≤ (SY (τ |D,X)|Z,X ] = τ (7)
The moment equation given in (7) provides a statistical restriction that can
be used to estimate the structural parameters α and β. Equation 7 is equivalent
to the statement that 0 is the τ -th quantile of random variable Y −SY (τ |D,X)
conditional on (Z,X):
0 = QY−SY (τ |D,X)(τ |Z,X) (8)
for each τ . We want to find an S(τ |D,X) such that 0 is the solution to the
quantile regression of Y − SY (τ |D,X) on (Z, X):
0 = arg min
f∈(F )
Eρτ [(Y − SY (τ |D,X)− f(Z,X))], (9)
where F is the class of measurable functions of (X ,Z).
Considering a finite sample analog for the above procedure, the conventional
quantile regression objective function can be defined as
Qn(τ, α, β, γ) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
ρτ (Yi −D′iα−X ′iβ − Z ′iγ)Vi (10)
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where D is a dim(α)-vector of endogenous variables, X is a dim(β)-vector of
exogenous explanatory variables, Zi ≡ (f(Xi, Zi)) is a dim(γ)-vector of in-
strumental variables such that dim(γ)≥(dim(α)). We set Vi = 1. To find an
estimate for α(τ), we will look for a value α that makes the coefficient on the
instrumental variable γ̂(α, τ) as close to 0 as possible. Formally, let
α̂(τ) = arg inf
α∈(A)
[Wn(α)],Wn(α) := n[γ̂(α, τ)
′]Â(α)[γ̂(α, τ)] (11)
We set A(α) equals to the inverse of the asymptotic covariance matrix of√
n(γ̂(α, τ)− γ(α, τ), where Wn(α) is the Wald statistic for testing γ(α, τ) = 0.
The parameter estimates are then given by θ̂(τ) := (α̂(τ), β̂(τ)) : (α̂(τ), β̂(α̂(τ), τ)).
In practice, for each probability index τ of interest, α and β are computed as
follows. We first define a set of values αj , j = 1, ..., J , and run the ordinary
quantile regression of Yi − D′iαj on Xi and Zi to obtain coefficients β̂(αj , τ)
and γ̂(αj , τ). We then save the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of
γ̂(αj , τ) to use as Â(αj) in Wn(αj), that becomes a Wald statistic for testing
γ(αj , τ) = 0. Finally, we choose the value α̂(τ) that minimizes Wn(α). The
estimate of β(τ) is then given by β̂(α̂(τ), τ).
5.3 Results from the IV Quantile Regression approach
In Table 9 we report the IV and IVQR estimates for the pooled sample, for which
the values of the F-test for the joint significance of the excluded instruments in
the first stage regression, for both male and females, pass the threshold value
of 10 (as the rule of thumb suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997)). At country
level the situation is, instead, more problematic, given that for both samples
the instruments turned out to be weak. We therefore decided not to report
them. 28 First of all, we note that the IV obesity coefficients (column 1) are
negative for both male and female, even if for male the effect is much larger in
size. But if we look at the effect of obesity over the entire wage distribution, the
story is much different, in that the negative effect is found only in the highest
quantiles for both the samples. Moreover, if we compare the IVQR and the
QR coefficients, interesting differences seem to appear. The obesity estimate
for women is significant and very large in size (15-20%) only in the highest
quantile, while it was significant all along the distribution and much lower in
the QR case. Similarly, striking differences also appear between QR and IVQR
for men. In fact, while in the QR case the obesity penalty was significant below
the 25th percentile, in the IVQR approach it turns out to be significant starting
at the 75th percentile. When we tested for the difference between the QR and
IVQR coefficents we failed to reject the equality between the QR and the IVQR
estimates (available upon request from the authors), apart for the 25th quantile
28The full set of results is available upon request.
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Table 9: IV and IVQR Regression Estimates, Obesity, Overweight and Under-
weight Coefficient
Women
IV α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Obesity -0.065* 0.144 0.066 0.154 -0.156** -0.206**
Overweight -0.186* 0.196 0.411 0.195 0.317 -0.216*
Underweight -0.129 1.478 2.593 1.674 4.152 3.011
F-test first step F(31,10760)=17.17
Obesity Prob > F = 0.0000
F-test first step F(31,10760)=20.97
Overweight Prob > F = 0.0000
F-test first step F(31,10760)=12.92
Underweight Prob > F = 0.0000
Men
IV α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Obesity -0.337** 0.559 0.566 0.384 -0.224* -0.044**
Overweight -0.061 -0.834 -0.662 -0.747 -0.759* -0.602
Underweight -0.922 -2.569 -7.302 -7.322 -3.071 -4.359
F-test first step F(31,19276)=18.54
Obesity Prob > F = 0.0000
F-test first step F( 31,19276) =19.38
Overweight Prob > F = 0.0000
F-test first step F( 31,19276)=4.42
Underweight Prob > F = 0.0000
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Notes: Control variables include: time and country dummies, individual age, cohabitation
status (living in couple or not), presence of children under twelve in the household, health
status (bad or good health status) number of days absent from work, highest level of
education completed (primary, secondary and tertiary), sector of activity (public or private),
health insurance status (whether the health insurance is provided by the employer), sector
(agriculture, industry and services) and occupational category (Professionals, Clerks,
Agriculture and Fishery occupations, Elementary occupations).
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in the male sample when the difference is significant at 5%. However, it is hard
to say if it depends on lack of differences among coefficients or on large standard
errors. 29 For this reason, we keep on investigating the possible reasons for the
difference between QR and IVQR coefficients.
Table 10: Quantile Regression Estimates for the Restricted Sample: Obesity,
Overweight and Underweight Coefficients
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Women
Obesity -0.051* -0.064** -0.060*** -0.053** -0.020
Overweight 0.001 -0.017* -0.020** -0.027** -0.023*
Underweight -0.033 -0.026 0.019 0.040 0.010
Men
Obesity 0.012 0.014 0.021 0.014 0.020
Overweight 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.036***
Underweight 0.001 -0.039 -0.036 0.052 0.088
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Notes: Control variables are as in Table 2.
The differences between QR and IVQR estimates may arise from the combi-
nation of two sources. The first, and most obvious, has to do with the reduction
of the sample size, due to the construction of the instrument (see table A-1 in
the appendix). The second has to do with the different estimation technique
(QR vs IVQR). In order to separate these two effects, we have first compared the
QR estimates based on the unrestricted sample with the QR estimates based
on the restricted sample and then these latter with the IVQR estimates. As
expected, comparing the unrestricted QR estimates (see Tables 4 and 5) with
the restricted QR estimates reported in Table 10 we can see that selection bias
determines sizeable differences both in magnitude and significance across the
two samples.
In fact, it must be noticed that in the case of single households with deceased
parents, couples with no children, couples with children aged less than sixteen,
or households whose components are not biologically related (step, adopted
and foster child, son and daughter in law, or just household’s components not
related), it is not possible to calculate the biological BMI and thus these obser-
vations need to be excluded from the sample. In our specific case, this procedure
29We have used the following strategy. According to these results (available upon request
from the authors) We have first computed βQR and βIV QR for each quantile and boost-
rapped M times. Then, for each bootstrap value we have computed i) the difference (βQR,m-
βIV QR,m), ii) the standard deviation of these M differences and iii) have applied the formula:
(βQR,m-βIV QR,m)/sd(βIV QR,m − βIV QR,m). This procedure has been replicated for each
quintile.
30
leads to a sharp reduction of the observations from 77,687 to 30,100.30 As noted
by Brunello and d’Hombres (2007) this could lead to select a non random sample
of the population. Indeed, comparing the initial sample to the restricted sample
we actually find that, while the average BMI in the two samples is very close,
individuals in the restricted sample are on average younger, less educated, with
lower average wage and belong to larger households. Moreover, individuals in
Southern Europe countries have a higher probability of being included in the
restricted sample because these countries are characterized by larger household
size with respect to Northern Europe countries.31 Finally, comparing the IVQR
estimates reported in Table 9 with the QR estimates for the restriced sample in
Table 10, we can see that the differences in the coefficient estimates are stressed
even further.
In conclusion, in light of this lack of robustness in the estimates, the concern
around the instrument adopted, and the impossibility to statistically prove that
QR and IVQR estimates are different, we suggest caution when interpreting the
relationship between obesity and wages as causal in the ECHP data.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the statistical association between obesity
and wages along the wage distribution and, contrary to most work on this
topic, we have taken care of the existing country heterogeneity by modeling the
relationship between obesity and wages country by country. In the first part
30See table A-1 for the steps of the selection procedure. Descriptive statistics of the reduced
sample are available upon request.
31Unfortunately, with the IVQR testing for selection bias is not an easy task, nor it is always
possible to test for it. In fact, the standard two-step approach suggested by Wooldridge (2002)
and applied by Brunello and d’Hombres (2007) cannot be adopted in this case. A possible
alternative could be represented by a test proposed by Buchinsky (2001), but unfortunately
it relies on the assumption that the vector of Xs is uncorrelated with the error term. This
represents a strong assumption in our context, given that it remains valid only if quantiles
are parallel (or, equivalently, that the βs are equal across quantiles) as proven by Melly and
Huber (2007). The test we have carried out rejects the equality of most pair-wise comparisons
of the βs (results are available upon requests) in many countries (exceptions are Denmark,
Ireland, Italy and Spain), and in case of the pooled model for almost all male coefficients.
Based on these results, we decided not to test for selection bias. However, as we believe
that the selection process is an important issue when addressing the endogeneity problem by
means of IV technique with ECHP data, we have used the two-step procedure suggested by
Wooldridge (2002) to check the presence of selection bias between OLS and IV estimates. We
have achieved identification through exclusion restrictions. As in Brunello and d’Hombres
(2007), we have used the number of adults in the household as exclusion restriction, but
differently from them we find that the selection bias correction does affect the magnitude
of the coefficients for both men and women and, moreover, the Mills ratios are statistically
significant. This result casts even more doubts on the representativeness of the restricted
sample (results are available upon request).
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of the paper we have produced evidence of a negative statistical relationship,
computed at the mean, between wages and obesity, and that this relationship is
far from being homogeneous across countries and across wage quantiles. These
results show that the mean and quantile approaches lead to different interpreta-
tion of the phenomenon under scrutiny, partly in line with the results obtained
by Fahr (2006) and Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2007).
Considering the pooled data, the relationship seems to be negative and signif-
icant all over the distribution for women and negative and significant only in the
bottom part of the distribution for men, suggesting that males with less reward-
ing jobs are also more hit by obesity status. Furthermore, it was not possible
to identify common patterns across countries that could be interpreted as en-
vironmental, cultural or institutional factors affecting the relationship between
wages and obesity as instead suggested by Brunello and d’Hombres (2007).
We have also shown that this negative relationship holds even after con-
trolling for decrease of productivity due to health problems, agents’ myopic
behavior, and provision of health insurance by employers, thus suggesting that
residual wage differences are due to employer discrimination. Whether this dis-
crimination could be more in the vein of ”taste” discrimination (Becker, 1971)
or of ”statistical discrimination” (Aigner and Cain, 1977) requires a different
analysis that is beyond the scope of this work. 32
Finally, in an attempt to control for endogeneity and to interpret our esti-
mates as causal relationships, we have employed an IVQR technique. Unfortu-
nately, the results we obtain can hardly be considered as conclusive for two main
reasons: i) we cannot prove that the instrument we have chosen is orthogonal
with the error term in the wage equation, and ii) the construction of the in-
strument imposes a significant and non-random cut in our sample that prevent
us from comparing the QR and IVQR estimates. In conclusion, in the light of
this lack of robustness in the estimates, and the concern around the instrument
adopted, we suggest caution when interpreting the relationship between obesity
and wages as causal with the ECHP data.
Why this discrimination exists in some quintiles and not in others or in
all quantiles but with different intensity is not yet clearly understood. Several
laboratory studies (see Roehling, 1999) analyze common stereotypes of obese
workers that prove how obese workers are assumed to be lazy, less conscientious,
less competent, sloppy, disagreeable, to lack self-discipline, and emotionally un-
stable. All these reasons can equally explain wage discrimination as well as
promotion, hiring and termination of job. Unfortunately, to our knowledge no
32In order to test this hypothesis we should have focused more on the role of starting
wages as in Neumark (1999, p.415), where the author clearly state that ”starting wages
can potentially reflect either of the two types of discrimination - taste discrimination and
statistical discrimination - in a fairly simple way, and an analysis of starting wages leads to
some straightforward tests of these alternative models of discrimination”.
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laboratory study or other empirical analyses seems to exist that may explain
why this discrimination may change across the wage distribution. This may
partly due to the fact that no one has ever thought about the possibility that
discrimination exists only at certain levels of the wage distribution. In this
sense, our work could be a valid starting point for new research in this field.
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Table A-2: Descriptive Statistics, Pooled Sample
Unrestricted Sample Restricted Sample
Women Men Women Men
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Log Hourly Wage 1.85 0.46 1.99 0.44 1.79 0.55 1.92 0.54
BMI 23.73 3.91 25.75 3.35 23.76 4.06 25.76 3.26
bBMI - - - - 24.72 3.23 24.53 3.29
Height 163.68 6.45 175.01 7.53 163.1 6.45 174.15 7.42
Weight 63.53 10.7 78.92 11.65 63.10 10.54 78.14 11.13
Sickness 1.26 4.52 0.77 3.36 1.05 4.10 0.75 3.35
Training 0.42 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.33 0.47 0.31 0.46
Private 0.57 0.5 0.7 0.46 0.59 0.49 0.71 0.45
Insurance 0.34 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.26 0.44 0.32 0.47
Age 39.3 9.49 40.47 9.68 38.48 9.23 40.49 9.87
Couple 0.69 0.46 0.74 0.44 0.72 0.45 0.78 0.41
Children 0.34 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.39 0.49
Primary 0.31 0.46 0.39 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.45 0.5
Secondary 0.38 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.35 0.48
Tertiary 0.31 0.46 0.23 0.42 0.28 0.45 0.21 0.4
Bad Health 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.16
Smoker 0.24 0.43 0.38 0.48 0.24 0.43 0.4 0.49
Professionals 0.36 0.48 0.28 0.45 0.31 0.46 0.24 0.43
Clerks 0.37 0.48 0.19 0.39 0.38 0.48 0.2 0.4
AgrFishery 0.07 0.25 0.25 0.43 0.08 0.28 0.25 0.43
Elementary 0.15 0.36 0.22 0.42 0.18 0.39 0.24 0.43
Agriculture 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.18
Industry 0.17 0.38 0.38 0.49 0.20 0.40 0.41 0.49
Services 0.70 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.73 0.45 0.51 0.50
Obs. 30,313 47,374 10,792 19,308
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Table A-3: Descriptive Statistics by Country, Unrestricted Sample (ctd.)
Portugal Spain
Women Men Women Men
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Log Hourly Wage 1.46 0.56 1.57 0.5 1.94 0.49 2.04 0.45
BMI 24.42 4.35 25.85 3.18 23.06 3.58 26.2 3.48
Height 160.56 5.85 169.99 6.48 162.42 6.1 172.95 7.2
Weight 62.82 10.6 74.7 10.09 60.75 9.38 78.38 11.38
Sickness 1.15 4.8 0.83 4 1.01 4.29 0.74 3.66
Training 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.39 0.49 0.3 0.46
Private Sector 0.72 0.45 0.82 0.38 0.66 0.47 0.8 0.4
Insurance 0.18 0.38 0.24 0.43 0.44 0.5 0.46 0.5
Age 38.38 9.75 39.38 9.98 37.81 9.22 40.13 9.71
Couple 0.71 0.45 0.74 0.44 0.56 0.5 0.71 0.46
Children 0.41 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.28 0.45 0.35 0.48
Primary 0.64 0.48 0.74 0.44 0.3 0.46 0.51 0.5
Secondary 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.34 0.21 0.41 0.19 0.39
Tertiary 0.21 0.4 0.13 0.33 0.49 0.5 0.3 0.46
Bad Health 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.23 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14
Smoker 0.13 0.34 0.37 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.43 0.5
Professionals 0.24 0.43 0.18 0.39 0.41 0.49 0.27 0.44
Clerks 0.33 0.47 0.18 0.39 0.35 0.48 0.16 0.37
AgrFishery 0.14 0.35 0.34 0.47 0.05 0.21 0.3 0.46
Elementary 0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.19 0.39 0.26 0.44
Agriculture 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.13 0.05 0.21
Industry 0.28 0.45 0.49 0.5 0.16 0.36 0.44 0.5
Services 0.69 0.46 0.47 0.5 0.83 0.38 0.51 0.5
OBS. 4,895 6,811 3,782 7,509
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Table A-5: Trade Union Density, Bargaining Governability and EPL
Union Density Bargaining EPL
Governability Strictness
Austria 37% 3 2.3
Belgium 56% 1 2.5
Denmark 74% 4 1.5
Finland 76% 4 2.1
Greece 27% (a) 3.5
Ireland 38% 1 1.1
Italy 35% 1 3.4
Portugal 24% 3 3.7
Spain 15% 3 3.1
Notes: Trade union density is defined as the proportion of the labor force belonging to a trade union
(for details see OECD 2004). Bargaining governability is an indicator of vertical co-ordination and
is a measure of the extent to which collective contracts are effectively followed at lower levels. This
indicator assumes the following values: 4 when collective agreement are legally enforceable and there is an
automatic peace obligation during the validity of the agreement; 3 when collective agreement are legally
enforceable and there are widespread but optional peace of obligation clauses in agreements; 2 when
there is legal enforceability, but no effective tradition or practice of peace of obligation clauses; 1 when
neither of the above conditions are effectively present. For further detail on bargaining governability, see
OECD (2004) and Traxler et al. (2001). The EPL is a summary indicator, obtained as weighted average
of three main components: protection against individual dismissal of a regular employee, protection
against individual dismissal of a temporary employee and protection against collective dismissals. For
further details on EPL see OECD (1999).
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